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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The District Court granted Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City 
Corporation's (hereinafter "the City") Motion for Summary Judgment on July 8, 
2002, dismissing all the claims against the City. Plaintiffs/Appellants George and 
Kathy Goebel (hereinafter "the Goebels") filed a timely appeal, vesting 
jurisdiction in this Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Only one of the six issues raised by the Goebels affects or involves the 
City. Thus, the City will only address Issue No. 6, i.e. "Whether the District Court 
committed reversible error in granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which ruling was predicated on the proposition that the 1998 amendments to the 
Governmental Immunity Act, regarding recipients of notices of claims, should be 
applied retroactively." The Goebels set forth the correct standard of review and 
they preserved the issue as indicated in their Appellants' Brief at page 6. 
III. STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THIS APPEAL 
The Goebels set forth in their Appellants' Addendum the applicable statutes 
that are relevant to the issue involving the City. Unfortunately, they indicate that 
the cited sections of the Governmental Immunity Act in effect on the date of the 
injury and the sections in effect at the time they filed their Notice of Claim relate 
to "Issue No. 3." The City has no involvement in anything concerning Issue No. 3 
as enunciated at page 4 of the Goebels' Appellants' Brief. Therefore, for 
clarification, the following statutes are important to the interpretation of Issue No. 
6. 
On the date of Mr. Goebel's injury, the following relevant provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act were m effect: 
U.C.A. § 63-30-11(2): Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii): The notice of claim shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the 
requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-13: A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
On the date the Goebels filed their Notice of Claim, the following relevant 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act were in effect: 
U.C.A. § 63-30-11(2): Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice 
of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether 
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
U.C.A, § 63-30-ll(3)(b)(ii)(A): The notice of claim shall be directed and 
delivered to the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-13: A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body 
of the political subdivision according to the requirements of Section 63-30-
11 within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any 
extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Governmental Immunity Act mandates strict compliance. On the date 
the Goebels filed their Notice of Claim, the Governmental Immunity Act required 
that they direct and deliver the Notice of Claim to the Salt Lake City Recorder's 
Office. The Goebels did not do this. Rather, they delivered their claim to the 
Mayor and the Salt Lake City Council, relying on the provision of the 
Governmental Immunity Act in effect on the date of Mr. Goebel's injury. 
The Goebel's argued that the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 
in place at the time of Mr. Goebel's injury were controlling and, as such, they 
were not required to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act in effect at the 
time they filed their claim because the 1998 amendments to the Act could not be 
retroactively applied. The 1998 amendment only changed the identity of the 
recipient of the notice, thereby fitting into the procedural/clarification exception to 
the general rule against applying statutes retroactively. 
The 1998 amendment was both procedural and a clarification of the original 
statute. Therefore, if this Court accepts the Goebels' contention that the 
controlling statute was the one in place on the date of injury, the 1998 amendment 
fits squarely within the recognized exception that allows retroactive application. 
If, however, this Court deems the controlling statute to be the one in place on the 
date the Notice of Claim was filed, then dismissal was likewise warranted because 
Plaintiffs failed to direct and delivery their notice of claim to the City Recorder, as 
required by the 1998 amendment in place at the time they filed the claim. 
The trial court correctly found that the 1998 amendment in place at the time 
the Goebels filed their Notice of Claim applied to the case, was procedural and 
thus, could be applied retroactively and that the Goebel's failure to file with the 
City Recorder's office was fatal to their claims against the City. The trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City should be affirmed. 
V. ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY 
A- The court mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
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The Utah courts have always recognized that Utah law mandates strict 
compliance with the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. See, e.g. 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 19, 977 P.2d 1201. Recently, this 
Court has reiterated its strict compliance mandate in Greene v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 2001 UT 109 f 20, 37 P.3d 1156: 
"Utah law requires strict compliance with the explicit instructions 
outlined in the Immunity Act. Failure to strictly comply with these 
requirements deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction and precludes a 
claimant from bringing suit against a governmental entity." Id. 
Also, in Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 WL 104818, 40 P.3d 632, this Court 
recently reiterated: "[T]he Immunity Act demands strict compliance with its 
requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. The notice of claim 
provision, particularly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything less." 
(Emphasis added) Id. at f 13. 
The District Court correctly ruled that the Goebels had failed to strictly 
comply with the Notice of Claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. Plaintiffs failed to direct and deliver their Notice of Claim to the City 
Recorder. 
Pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. 63-30-1 et seq., a 
party must file a written notice of claim with the governmental entity as a 
prerequisite to filing suit. It is well established that Utah law mandates strict 
compliance with the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Rushton v. 
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Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 19, 977 P. 2d 1201; Greene v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 2001 UT 109,112, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
The Goebels filed their Notice of Claim on August 11, 1998. The 1998 
amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act were effective at the time of 
filing. (Hearing on Judge Medley's ruling, Appellants' Addendum at p. 010; See, 
also, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order attached hereto as the City's 
Appellee Addendum 1). On that date, the Governmental Immunity Act provided 
that the Notice of Claim shall be directed and delivered to "the city or town 
recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town." U.C.A. 63-30-
1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A). The Utah Supreme Court has opined "[w]here, as here, the 
statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no 
reason to require anything less than strict compliance." Greene at f l4. At the 
time the Goebels filed their Notice of Claim, the statute was clear, readily 
available and easily accessible by the Goebels' able and seasoned counsel. Thus, 
strict compliance required the Goebels to adhere to the Notice of Claim provision 
in effect at the time they filed their Notice of Claim on August 11, 1998. In order 
to strictly comply, the Goebels were required to direct and deliver their notice to 
the Salt Lake City Recorder. 
In this case, the Goebels did not direct and deliver their Notice of Claim to 
the Salt Lake City Recorder, as mandated by the Immunity Act. The trial court 
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correctly found this to be fatal to their causes of action against the City. (Hearing 
on Judge Medley's ruling, Appellants' Addendum at p. 010; See, also, the City 
Appellee's Addendum 1) "Compliance with the Immunity Act is necessary to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against 
governmental entities. . . . Thus, failure to comply with the Immunity Act requires 
a trial court to dismiss a complaint." Greene at f 16. The trial court's dismissal of 
the Goebel's claims against the City comports with well-established case law. 
C, The 1998 revisions to the notice of claim requirements are procedural 
and can be applied retroactively. 
It is well recognized that, pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act, 
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 et seq., a party must file a written notice of claim with the 
governmental entity as a prerequisite to filing suit. As stated above, the Goebels 
filed their Notice of Claim on August 11, 1998 and failed to adhere to the 
requisites of the Governmental Immunity Act in effect at the time of filing. 
Because there is no case that specifically states that the provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act in place at the time the Notice of Claim is filed (or 
conversely that the provisions in place on the date of injury) are controlling, the 
Goebels argued to the trial court that the Notice of Claim provision in effect on the 
date of the accident was controlling and should apply thereby rendering the 1998 
amendment inapplicable. The Goebels contended that the 1998 amendment to the 
Governmental Immunity Act cannot be applied retroactively, thereby preventing 
their failure to file with the City Record from divesting the trial court of 
jurisdiction. The Goebels' contention, however, is contrary to the well-established 
law that retroactive application of a statute is permitted when the statutory changes 
are only procedural in nature or clarify the original statute. See, Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corp, v. Utah State Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1998). 
The Goebels point out that Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 provides that statutes 
are not to be applied retroactively unless expressly declared by the legislature. 
The Goebels, of course, fail to point out that a well-known exception exists to that 
rule. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this exception which: 
. . . permits retroactive application "where a statute 
changes only procedural law by providing a different 
mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights" without enlarging or eliminating vested rights. 
Roarkv. Crabtree, 983 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 
1983)). 
Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp., 953 P.2d at 437. Here, the amendment to 
the notice of claim provision which requires claimants to direct and deliver the 
notice of claim to the City Recorder rather than the "governing body" merely 
provides a very small change in the procedure for filing the notice of claim. Prior 
to the 1998 amendment, claimants were required to file a notice of claim in order 
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to perfect their claims against the City just as they were required to do so after the 
1998 amendment. See, Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 49 P.2d 405, 
407 (1935) (a cause of action against the government was barred where a notice of 
claim was not filed prior to institution of suit); Roosendaal Construction & Mining 
Corp. v. Holman, 503 P.2d 446, 448 (Utah 1972) (a prerequisite to pursuing a 
claim against the state is compliance with the act's notice of claim provision, § 63-
30-12); Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109 f 11, 37 P.3d 1156 
(pursuant to the Immunity Act, a party must file a written notice of claim with the 
governmental entity as a prerequisite to filing suit). Thus, the 1998 amendment 
only changed the identity of the recipient of the notice. Judge Medley correctly 
concluded: 
In this Court's view, the 1998 revisions were not substantive; that they 
were procedural; that they only change the place where notice is to be 
delivered [and] didn't affect any of the substantive rights of plaintiffs at all. 
It was purely procedural. 
(Hearing on Judge Medley's ruling, Appellants' Addendum at p. 010). 
This Court has also recognized the "long-standing exception to the general 
rule against applying statutes retroactively" for statutory amendments that merely 
clarify the original statute. Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 440. In a recent 
decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In 1998 the Utah Legislature amended the Immunity Act, clarifying 
exactly to whom notices must be directed and delivered. Instead of 
using such general terms, the amended immunity act explicitly lists 
the individuals to whom the notice must be directed and delivered 
depending on the type of governmental entity involved. 
Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109 f 13, 37 P.3d 1156 (emphasis 
added). Based upon this Court's own interpretation of the 1998 amendment, it fits 
within the clarification exception and, as such, the 1998 amendment must be given 
retroactive effect. 
The 1998 amendment was both procedural and a clarification of the original 
statute. Therefore, if this Court accepts the Goebels5 contention that the 
controlling statute was the one in place on the date of injury, the 1998 amendment 
fits squarely within the recognized exception that allows retroactive application. 
If, however, this Court deems the controlling statute to be the one in place on the 
date the Notice of Claim was filed, then dismissal was likewise warranted because 
The Goebels failed to direct and delivery their Notice of Claim to the City 
Recorder as required by the 1998 amendment in place at the time they filed the 
claim. 
The Goebels urge this Court to rely on the case oiSchultz v. Conger, 755 
P.2d 165(Utah 1988) to dispose of this appeal in their favor. Their argument is 
unavailing. The Schultz case is inapposite because, in Schultz, the statutory 
change required a plaintiff to file a claim within one hear of the injury (LLC. A. 63-
30-13) whereas prior to the change, a plaintiff suing a municipal employee who 
was engaged in a nongovernmental act was not required to comply with the one-
10 
year provision at all. Id. at 166. The situation in Schultz cannot be perceived as 
merely procedural or as a simple clarification of a provision already in place. 
Rather, it imposed a statute of limitations for certain claims where, prior to the 
change, there was none. Here, on the date of Mr. Goebel's injury, he was required 
to file a Notice of Claim with the governing body of Salt Lake City. On the date 
the Goebels filed their claim, the 1998 amendment then in place was purely 
procedural, clarifying where the notice should be filed, i.e. the City Recorder's 
Office. With facts so diverse, it would be inappropriate to apply the reasoning of 
Schultz to this case. 
Also unavailing is the Goebel's argument that if this Court gives retroactive 
application to the 1998 amendment, "no plaintiff in a claim against a Utah 
governmental entity could ever rest assured that his or her notice of claim would 
remain in compliance with the law, and no judgment against a Utah governmental 
entity would truly ever be final... [uncertainty would reign." (Appellants' Brief 
at pp. 48-49). With all due respect to the Appellants and their counsel, that 
argument makes no sense. The Goebel's argument anticipates that changes to the 
Governmental Immunity Act would be applied against a plaintiff, who was "in 
clear compliance with the law not only as of the date the claim arose. . . but also as 
of the date of service of the notice" (Appellants Brief at p. 47) or a plaintiff who 
had obtained a judgment against a governmental entity and lead to dismissal. Id. 
First, those facts are not present in this matter since the Goebels were clearly not 
in compliance with the Notice of Claim provision of the Governmental Immunity 
Act at the time they filed their notice, and they did not obtain a judgment against 
the City that, as a result of the 1998 amendment, was taken away from them. 
Moreover, the case law reflects that this Court is loathe to condone or apply such 
an unreasonable proposal or result. See, e.g. Hall v. Utah State Dept. of 
Corrections, 2001 UT 34 If 1, n. 1 and \ 8, n. 2, 24 P. 3d 958 (changes to two 
sections of Public Employees Act became effective after entry of trial court's final 
order and are not relevant to issues before the Court (f 1, n. 1); subsequent to 
plaintiffs institution of his suit in court, amendments to notice of claim provision 
Governmental Immunity Act were adopted but are immaterial to Court's analysis 
and do not affect result (f 8, n. 2)). 
The trial court's ruling is appropriate and is based upon well-recognized 
legal precepts. As such, the court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
City should be affirmed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Goebels' claims against the City. The City respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in its favor. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 980912368PI 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this 
court for oral argument on June 4,2002. Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City") was 
represented by its counsel, Assistant City Attorney Martha S. Stonebrook and the plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel, Peter Collins. The court, after taking the matter under advisement, 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 11,1998, plaintiffs George and Kathy Goebel filed a Notice of Claim. 
2. An amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act was passed on February 23,1998, 
approved March 14, 1998 and became effective on May 4, 1998. 
3. The 1998 amendment to § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A) of the Governmental Immunity Act 
required that a notice of claim be "directed and delivered to the city or town recorder, 
when the claim is against an incorporated city or town." 
4. The 1998 amendment only changed the identity of the recipient of the notice. 
5. The notice of claim filed by plaintiffs was directed and delivered to Jan Graham, Utah 
Transit Authority, Salt Lake City Mayor DeeDee Corradini and the Salt Lake City 
Council and all its members. 
6. Plaintiffs' notice of claim was not directed or delivered to the Salt Lake City 
Recorder. 
7. On December 17, 1999, Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff Kathy Goebel's loss of consortium claim for lack of jurisdiction on the 
grounds that plaintiffs did not set forth or identify the claim for loss of consortium or 
any damages suffered by plaintiff Kathy Goebel. 
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8. Plaintiffs opposed the City's motion arguing that they substantially complied with the 
notice of claim requirements by identifying Kathy Goebel as a claimant, despite 
plaintiffs' admission that they "inadvertently neglected specifically to state, in the 
subject notice of claim, that plaintiff Kathy Goebel's claim was for loss of 
consortium" and that "review of that notice of claim will establish the fact that there 
is no specific delineation of the loss of consortium nature of that claim." 
9. The City, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, requested that this court reassess its 
ruling on the City's Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
2. The 1998 amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act was procedural and 
clarified the original statute and can be applied retroactively. 
3. The statutory notice of claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act that 
were in effect on the date plaintiffs filed their notice of claim on August 11, 1998 
apply to plaintiffs' claim. 
4. Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements because they 
did not direct and deliver their notice of claim to the Salt Lake City Recorder as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A). 
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5. Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirement of the 
Governmental Immunity Act because they failed to set forth the nature of plaintiff 
Kathy Goebel's loss of consortium claim. 
6. Simply placing a woman's name on a notice of claim is not sufficient to give notice 
of a loss of consortium claim and does not constitute strict compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
7. This court lacks jurisdiction over all claims plaintiffs have brought against the City. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and after reviewing the 
pleadings provided by both parties, the relevant case law, and after hearing the arguments of 
counsel, this court, for good cause shown thereon, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES 
1. Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the 
grounds that plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Upon review and reconsideration, this court's previous order denying Salt Lake 
City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the loss of consortium claim is vacated and 
Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim is dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiffs 
failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity act, thereby depriving this court of jurisdiction. 
4 
3. All claims against Salt Lake City are dismissed with prejudice. 
4. As the prevailing party, Salt Lake City Corporation shall submit a Bill of 
Costs for this court's consideration. 
DATED this ft day of X ^ t V , 2002. 
HE THIRD DISTRIC COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Peter Collins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Scott Savage/Casey McGarvey 
Attorneys for Salt Lake Southern1 Railroad 
Jesse^entadue/KatKieeh L£ 
Attorneys for Utah Transit Authority 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £<^ day of June, 2002,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order first class postage prepaid, to: 
Peter Collins 
Law Office of Peter Collins 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
/a^^^mm<y/^ 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to be hand delivered to: 
Kent W. Hansen 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
Law Department 
280 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Union Pacific Railroad 
Jesse Trentadue 
Kathleen M. Liuzzi 
Suitter Axland 
175 South West Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
Attorneys for Utah Transit Authority 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company 
